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Abstract
Performance measurement and evaluation systems are among the most common man-
agement instruments. An integral element of this process is the use of targets, typically
set in appraisal interviews and formalized via written target agreements. In this paper,
we investigate the relationship between performance management and evaluation sys-
tems and individual effort, proxied by the commonly used concept of work engagement.
Using four waves of a new representative, linked employer-employee data set, the Linked
Personnel Panel (LPP), we apply fixed effects estimations to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity. Our results show positive and statistically significant relationships between
the presence of a performance management and evaluation process and employee en-
gagement on the individual level. We are further able to differentiate between appraisal
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interviews and written target agreements which allows us to show a positive effect of
appraisal interviews and an additional positive effect of target agreements. In addition,
we find first evidence that these direct relationships are partially mediated by goal clarity
and procedural fairness.
Key Words: Target Agreements; Performance Appraisals; Work Engagement; Goal
Clarity; Procedural Fairness
JEL Classification: D23, J01, J33, M41, M52
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1 Introduction
Performance management systems constitute an important management practice in modern
organizations (Otley (1999), Franco-Santos et al. (2012)). An essential ingredient of this
framework is the performance management and evaluation process (PMEP), which comprises
formal target setting between supervisors and subordinates and performance evaluation (Fer-
reira and Otley (2009)), typically operated via annual appraisal interviews (AI). These AIs
can be conceptualized as a conversation about performance (Gordon and Stewart (2009),
p. 473) and might function by providing feedback to employees, counseling and developing
employees, and conveying and discussing compensation, job status, or disciplinary decisions
(Cederblom (1982), p. 219). During these AIs, supervisors often make use of written target
agreements (TA), where formalized targets are often set at the beginning of a fiscal year and
reviewed in the subsequent year.
According to recent evidence from the representative, matched employer-employee data
for private establishments from Germany used in this paper, the PMEP is of high practical
importance for firms. In 2018, 85% of establishments reported using appraisal interviews
while 80% reported employing written TAs. In addition, 64% of all employees working in
these establishments reported being covered by an AI and 42% reported having both an AI
and a written TA. Nevertheless, recently a lively debate about the outcomes and effectiveness
of performance reviews and target setting has emerged in many organizations. For instance
in 2015, Volkmar Denner, CEO of the German company Robert Bosch, publicly announced
to abandon compensation plans based on the achievement of individual targets.1 Companies
such as Commerzbank, SAP, and Infineon have undergone similar changes.2
Target setting aims at increasing the organization's productivity by aligning employee
incentives with organizational goals. The direct relationship between target setting and pro-
ductivity is thus likely to be mediated through employee decision-making and effort (Bender
et al. (2018)). However, despite decades of research in management accounting, applied psy-
chology, and organizational economics, prior literature has provided mixed evidence with
respect to the impact of feedback and target setting characteristics on employee effort and
employee performance3 (e.g. Podsakoff and Farh (1989), Locke and Latham (1990), Fisher
1Source: http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/karriere/mitarbeitermotivation-schafft-die-boni-
ab-a-1055113.html.
2See, for instance, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sap-appraisals/europes-biggest-software-maker-
sap-ditches-annual-reviews-idUSKCN10N0RO or https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/finance/variable-
compensation-commerzbank-eliminates-most-individual-bonuses-in-revamp/23583676.html.
3In this study, we regard employee performance as a consequence of employee effort.
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et al. (2000), Christ et al. (2012)) and on employee perceptions such as goal clarity and proce-
dural fairness (e.g. Lau and Buckland (2001), Marginson and Ogden (2005), Derfuss (2009),
Hartmann and Slapni£ar (2009), Voußem et al. (2016)).4 Classical goal-setting theory (e.g.
Locke and Latham (1990), Locke and Latham (2002)) expects specific, challenging targets5 to
boost performance and the literature examining participation in target setting largely finds
a positive impact on performance as well (e.g. Fisher et al. (2000); Wentzel (2002); Sholihin
et al. (2011)). Other studies, however, argue that challenging targets do not boost perfor-
mance of all individuals (Eyring and Narayanan (2018)), that target setting is associated with
costs often ignored by prior literature (Holzhacker et al. (2019)), and that these negative side
effects often outweigh its benefits (Barsky (2008), Ordóñez et al. (2009)).
It is important to note that prior studies using archival data are overwhelmingly based on
cross sectional data sets, often from single firms, with only a small number of observations.
This makes causal and generalizable interpretations difficult. We address this gap by using a
large linked employer-employee data set, representative for all German establishments with
more than 50 employees and their respective workforce. This allows us to move closer to
causality than previous studies do by exploiting the longitudinal dimension of our data and
using panel data methods. Thus, the first goal of this study is to provide more causal and
generalizable evidence on the average effects of AIs and formalized TAs on employee effort.
Second, we want to focus on effect heterogeneity by examining potential channels mediating
the relationship between target setting and employee effort, in particular procedural fairness
and goal clarity. In line with Lind and Tyler (1988), we define procedural fairness as referring
to the perception of fairness with respect to the process via which outcomes are determined.
The evidence with respect to the effect of (participation in) target setting on procedural
fairness is again heterogeneous. Some studies (e.g. Sholihin et al. (2011)) find a positive
impact of participation in budget setting and a sense of procedural fairness. Voußem et al.
(2016), for instance, argue that target characteristics such as subjectivity of performance
measures are important, while Ordóñez et al. (2009) argue that targets might even lead to a
feeling of unfairness. We consider goal clarity as our second potential mediator. In line with
Sholihin and Pike (2013), we define goal clarity as a clearer understanding of organizational
members about their goals. In a meta-analysis, Derfuss (2009) finds a positive relationship
4The literature uses different proxies for effort such as goal commitment (Sholihin et al. (2011)) or moti-
vation (Locke and Latham (2002)). For the purpose of readability, we subsume these constructs under the
term effort.
5Note that goal setting literature uses the term goal instead of target. For the sake of readability, we use
these two terms interchangeably.
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between participation in budget setting and goal clarity. In a recent lab experiment, Anderson
and Stritch (2015) in turn find a positive relationship between goal clarity and performance.
Thus, the second goal of our analysis is to examine whether the direct relationship between
our PMEP and employee effort is mediated by procedural fairness and goal clarity.
Our analysis is based on the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), a new matched employer-
employee data set representative for all German private sector establishments with more than
50 employees and their respective workforce (Kampkötter et al. (2016)). Due to the panel
structure of the data set, we are able to include various fixed effects in our model to ac-
count for omitted variable bias problems. As information on employee effort is difficult to
collect particularly in representative data sets, we employ the concept of work engagement
(Kahn (1990), Bakker (2017)), which is commonly applied in management and organizational
psychology and has recently been introduced into the management accounting literature (Li
and Sandino (2018)). This effort proxy has been empirically validated in various countries
(Schaufeli and Bakker (2003)) and its implementation in a representative sample of the work-
force allows us to shed some light on the nexus between individual effort and performance
management practices. We are particularly interested in differentiating between the effects
of a sole presence of an AI and the additional presence of a written TA in order to see if the
effect of the PMEP on employee effort is driven entirely by the AI or if formalization via a
written TA is of additional value for firms.
Our results show a positive and statistically significant effect of the presence of a PMEP
on employee effort as proxied by work engagement. This effect is robust across various spec-
ifications. We further find first evidence that both AIs and TAs positively affect employee
effort. While both the effects of AIs and TAs on work engagement are positive and statisti-
cally significant in all of our pooled OLS regressions, only the effect of AIs remain significant
in our individual fixed effects specification. In this context, we explicitly discuss a problem
commonly associated with the use of fixed effects in management practices research, namely
that there is not enough real time series variation (given measurement error) to identify any
significant relationships (Bender et al. (2018), p. 381). In our case, this means that only
very few individuals switch from having no TA to having a TA without jointly switching from
having no AI to having an AI (or vice versa). Hence, these HR measures in practice seem
to be applied quite simultaneously. In our mediation analysis, we find that both procedural
fairness and goal clarity partially mediate the direct effect of the PMEP on engagement.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. Our first and arguably most important
contribution relates to the use of panel data methods to reduce the likelihood of endogeneity
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problems such as omitted variable bias, which enables us to make more causal statements.
As outlined above, most studies examining the effect of target setting on individual effort and
the channels mediating this relationship rely on lab or field experiments (e.g. Liu and Zhang
(2015), Li and Sandino (2018), Holzhacker et al. (2019)), cross-sectional studies in single firms
(e.g. Sholihin et al. (2011)), or small non-random samples of firms (e.g. Sholihin and Pike
(2013)). While experiments are the best way to establish internal validity, they generally en-
counter problems related to external validity. Cross-sectional single firm case studies provide
in-depth insights into the studied organization but are prone to issues regarding causality
and generalizability. In the study most related to our paper, Sholihin et al. (2011) use data
comprising 54 managers from a UK financial services institution and analyze both the direct
effect of participative target setting on employee effort and the respective channels mediating
this relationship. They find that procedural fairness and interpersonal trust fully mediate this
direct relationship but call for future research using larger samples from various organizations
determined randomly (p. 145) to further examine their propositions and findings. We are
able to exploit four waves of a representative matched employer-employee data set compris-
ing between 771 and 1,219 establishments per wave and between 6,500 and 7,500 employees
randomly drawn from these establishments. Thus, we complement prior literature by being
able to make more generalizable statements and to test whether the relationships found also
hold for large, representative data.
Second, we add to the emerging literature on work engagement as a new proxy for employee
effort at the workplace. This concept has recently been introduced into the management
accounting literature by Li and Sandino (2018), who operationalize it via weekly salesperson
attendance at a given store. As such sales information is usually not available in representative
surveys spanning different industries, we employ a commonly used work engagement scale
(Kahn (1990), Bakker (2017)). We argue that this scale measures effort in a more general
way as concepts applied in previous studies using questionnaire data. Sholihin et al. (2011), for
instance, analyze if participation in target setting affects goal commitment, which is defined
as attachment to or determination to reach a goal (Locke and Latham (1990)) and willingness
to put in effort to attain a goal (Renn et al. (1999)) and argue that this concept is related to
employee effort and ultimately employee performance. While we agree with this statement,
we think that goal commitment as a concept might focus too much on the attainment of the
goal and might thus be too narrow to measure effort in a more general sense, as effort directed
on goal areas might also crowd out effort directed at non-goal areas (Ordóñez et al. (2009)).
Third, we contribute to the literature examining the general effect of target setting on
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employee effort and performance by showing a robust positive effect of our PMEP on employee
effort. We argue that we also contribute to the literature examining participation in target
setting. This is because, despite the fact that we do not know the exact contents of the AIs
and TAs, this process is likely to be participative to some extent, as superior and subordinate
meet in order to talk about the subordinate's targets. There are numerous studies examining
these links using lab experiments, single firm studies and literature reviews. In a literature
review, Locke and Latham (2006) emphasize a positive, linear relationship between goal
difficulty and task performance, as long as different goals are not conflicting, the respective
person is committed to the goal and possesses the necessary ability to attain it. With regards
to participation in target setting, Derfuss (2009) finds a positive relationship with employee
behavior that is beneficial to the organization. However, the author also states that many
studies use small samples, and their conflicting findings might be due to statistical artifacts,
such as sampling error (p. 203). In a field experimental setting, Eyring and Narayanan (2018)
provide evidence that challenging targets improve performance of above-median performers,
but damp performers of below median performers. Finally, there is also evidence that the way
that goals are set and communicated influences their effectiveness as well. Liu and Zhang
(2015) find that performance is highest when the achievement of the target is revealed ex
post (after the operation ends) rather than ex ante (before the operation starts) and when
performance-contingent incentives are framed as a bonus rather than a penalty. Holzhacker
et al. (2019) emphasize the potential costs of relative target setting, and analyze costs and
benefits using data from an industrial services company. Thus, while some studies emphasize
a positive impact of targets on effort and performance, others argue that the way that targets
are set is important and that under certain conditions, the impact on effort and performance
might even be negative. We thus use our representative data to provide evidence how targets
set via two common performance management practices influence employee effort on average.
For firms thinking about introducing (or abandoning) a PMEP, this may provide guidance
about how this might influence employee effort.
Fourth, by differentiating between AIs and TAs, we also contribute to the literature ana-
lyzing whether a formalization of targets is of additional value and provide evidence that it is
indeed. Locke and Latham (1990) e.g. state that specific, or more formalized, targets induce
higher levels of effort and performance as do do-your-best ones. In line with Hartmann and
Slapni£ar (2009), we hypothesize that targets might possess high formality in case they are
explicated by superiors in a quantitative and written fashion. By discussing the performance
of the last year and key areas of improvement, targets for the next period are set in a relatively
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informal way during an AI and might then be formalized via a written TA. Therefore, we
analyze if it is of additional value to move from a more informal way of setting targets to a
more formal one. First, this might be important for firms that discuss implementing a PMEP
and question whether an AI suffices or if a written TA adds additional value. Second, this
information might also be interesting for firms that already use AIs and think about further
formalizing the target setting process via a written TA.
Finally, we contribute to the debate about potential channels via which target setting
affects effort and performance. In particular, we consider two potential mediators: procedu-
ral fairness and goal clarity. While most authors (e.g. Libby (1999, 2001); Wentzel (2002);
Sholihin et al. (2011); Sholihin and Pike (2013)) find a positive link between (participation in)
target setting and procedural fairness, Voußem et al. (2016) examine whether procedural and
distributive fairness perceptions are influenced by the degree of subjectivity of performance
measures and find an inverted U-shape of this relationship. Ordóñez et al. (2009) argue that
targets or goals might even lead to a feeling of unfairness. This is because employees are het-
erogeneous with respect to their level of ability. The same targets might thus be to easy for
some individuals and too hard for others but when tailoring goals to individuals, some might
feel treated unfairly in case they have the feeling that rewards do not fairly match effort and
performance. With regards to the impact of procedural fairness on effort and performance,
there is no controversy in the literature such that most authors (e.g. Libby (1999, 2001);
Sholihin and Pike (2009); Zapata-Phelan et al. (2009)) find a positive effect. As outlined
above, Derfuss (2009) finds a positive relationship between participation in budget setting
and (among other dependent variables) goal clarity in a literature review, while Anderson
and Stritch (2015) find a positive relationship between goal clarity and performance in an ex-
perimental study. Thus, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence on whether, on
average, the positive effects of targets on procedural fairness found by most authors dominate
the negative side effects emphasized by Ordóñez et al. (2009) and whether this translates into
higher employee effort. Furthermore, we provide evidence whether goal clarity mediates the
direct relationship between targets and employee effort.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, we review the literature and develop our
hypotheses. In Chapter 3, we describe the data and our dependent and independent variables
of interest. Chapter 4 presents our empirical results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
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2 Background and Hypotheses Development
2.1 The impact of PMEP on effort
Prior literature has provided conflicting results with respect to the way in which targets influ-
ence employee effort and performance. Proponents of classical goal setting theory (e.g. Locke
and Latham (1990), Locke and Latham (2002), Locke and Latham (2006)) argue that there
is a positive linear relationship between the difficulty of the target and task performance.
They argue that challenging targets are more motivating because they induce a feeling of suc-
cess when targets are met and because such targets help employees to grow in the workplace
(Locke and Latham (2006)). Furthermore, attaining targets is often linked to bonus payments
(e.g. Kampkötter et al. (2017)). According to principal-agent theory, this link between pay
and performance aligns employee incentives with company goals and therefore induces effort
(Jensen and Murphy (1990)). We further argue that the PMEP in our setting is rather par-
ticipative, as the employee has at least the possibility to voice concerns during the AI. There
is an array of literature on participation in target setting and the relationship to employee
effort and performance. Sholihin et al. (2011), for instance, find a positive impact of par-
ticipation in target setting on goal commitment, which they use as their proxy for employee
effort. In a recent literature review, Derfuss (2009) finds a moderately strong relationship
between participation in budgeting and employee behaviors beneficial to the organization.
However, there is also evidence suggesting that under certain circumstances, targets might
lead to lower effort and performance. In a lab experiment, Seijts and Latham (2001) find that
do your best outcome goals have a larger effect on performance than specific, difficult out-
come goals, while they find the opposite for learning goals. This is the case as employees
might focus too much on the attainment of the desired outcome than on learning, which is
necessary to reach this outcome. Thus, even proponents of classical goal setting theory admit
that setting specific, challenging targets might not have a positive impact on employee per-
formance under every contingency. Li and Sandino (2018) provide evidence that challenging
tasks might discourage below-median performers, while Ordóñez et al. (2009) highlight fur-
ther potentially harmful side effects of target setting, among them crowding-out of intrinsic
motivation by extrinsic motivation. Therefore, the impact of targets on employee effort is not
unambiguous and the question about how targets affect employee effort on average in a large
and representative sample remains unanswered.
Since the bulk of literature on target setting and participation in target setting finds a
positive impact of the presence of a PMEP on employee effort, we expect the average effect
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to be positive but emphasize that it is ultimately an empirical question. We thus formulate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive effect of the presence of a PMEP on employee effort.
2.2 The effect of appraisal interviews and target agreements on em-
ployee effort
Next, we analyze the question whether formalization of targets is of value by differentiating
between AIs and TAs. Locke and Latham (1990) state that specific, more formalized targets
induce higher levels of effort as do your best targets. Hartmann and Slapni£ar (2009)
further posit that formal targets are superior to informal ones as they provide higher feedback
quality. They arguably specify the performance dimensions being evaluated and their link to
rewards better, ultimately increasing goal orientation and motivation. We argue that the two
components of the PMEP considered by us possess different degrees of formality. As described
in more detail in Section 3, an employee can only have a written TA in case she also receives
an AI. AIs are themselves not a completely informal way to set targets, as respondents in
our data set are asked to only consider pre-scheduled AI meetings. Nevertheless, explicating
these targets in a written form via a TA implies additional formality.
With respect to AIs, our study is closely related to Kampkötter (2017). By employing
representative German data on the employee level from the German Socio-economic Panel
(SOEP), he estimates the impact of performance appraisals on job satisfaction. Performance
appraisals as a concept are closely related to AIs as both comprise a developmental and an
evaluative function (e.g. Boswell and Boudreau (2002)). The developmental function aims
at improving an employee's effectiveness by enhancing her skills, attitudes, and experiences
(e.g. via identification of strengths, weaknesses, and training needs, or goal setting). Eval-
uation, in contrast, consists of comparing the employee's performance to a certain standard
and is often linked to decisions such as pay increases, promotion, or termination decisions.
Despite the similarities, we abstain from calling our measure a performance appraisal for
several reasons. As pointed out by Aguinis et al. (2013) and recently by Bayo-Moriones
et al. (2019), performance appraisals and performance management are two interrelated yet
distinct concepts in the sense that performance management is more general. Likewise, we
argue that the AI as part of our PMEP is more general than a performance appraisal as the
focus is not only on past performance, but also future potential. Indeed, the specific question
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used by Kampkötter (2017) focuses more closely on the evaluative function, while our mea-
sure is more balanced between the evaluative and developmental functions. The author finds
an overall positive effect of performance appraisals on job satisfaction, in particular when
performance appraisals are linked to monetary outcomes. However, the question whether
(performance) AIs are successful in increasing employee performance remains unexplored in
this study. Furthermore, the data used only provides information on the employee but very
crude information on the establishment the employee works in, an issue we are able to tackle
using linked employer-employee data. Considering that Kampkötter (2017) provides evidence
that performance appraisals on average lead to higher job satisfaction, an employee attitude
shown to lead to higher employee and organizational productivity (Krekel et al. (2019)), and
that AIs are used to set targets, we expect a positive impact of AIs on employee effort.
In contrast to the extensively studied topic of performance appraisals, research specifically
focusing on written TAs for employees is scarce.6 It is likely that TAs on the individual level
influence performance on the establishment level indirectly via beneficial employee behavior,
in particular via increased effort provision, but this has not been shown so far. Also, the role
of mediators such as goal clarity and procedural fairness has not been studied yet.
We thus examine whether there is a positive effect of AIs, as our less formal way of target
setting, on employee effort and whether a higher degree of formality as implied by written
TAs provides additional value. We therefore formulate the two following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive effect of the presence of an AI on employee effort.
Hypothesis 2b: There is an additional positive effect of the presence of a written TA on
employee effort.
2.3 Mediation analysis
It is likely that our PMEP does not only affect employee effort directly but also indirectly via
affecting other employee behaviors which then in turn affect effort. In particular, we consider
procedural fairness and goal clarity as potential mediators.
With respect to procedural fairness, our study is most closely related to Sholihin et al.
(2011) who use data comprising 54 managers from a UK financial services institution and ana-
lyze both the direct effect of participative target setting on employee effort and the respective
channels mediating this direct relationship. They find that the direct effect is fully mediated
6Using German establishment-level data, Kampkötter et al. (2017) find that establishments using TAs
achieve 5% higher sales, implying a positive impact of TAs on organizational performance.
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by procedural fairness and interpersonal trust meaning that the direct effect becomes insignif-
icant when these mediators are accounted for. We believe that, due to our methodological
advantages, our study serves as a complement as we analyze firms in different industries and
of different size.
There are various theories dedicated to understanding organizational justice.7 Fairness
Heuristics Theory (e.g. Lind and Tyler (1988); Lind (2001); van den Bos et al. (2001)), for
instance, argues that in most work situations, individuals are at risk of being exploited. Due
to this immanent risk of exploitation, they ask the question if the authority is to be trusted
(Cropanzano et al. (2001)). As it is impossible to accurately calculate trustworthiness for
each relationship, individuals use heuristics to facilitate the decision. Procedures such as
participation or voice signal in-group membership (van den Bos et al. (2001)), ultimately
increasing procedural fairness perception. Leventhal (1980) posits that individuals fairness
perceptions are influenced by six rules, in particular accuracy, bias suppression, consistency,
correctability, ethicality of procedures, and representativeness. Ordóñez et al. (2009), in
contrast, state that literature ignores potential negative effects of target setting on fairness
perceptions. In particular they argue that setting targets might in fact lead to a feeling
of unfairness rather than fairness. This is because employees possess heterogeneous ability,
making the same goal easily attainable for some individuals and too difficult to achieve for
others. However, tailoring goals to individuals might in turn lead to a feeling of unfairness as
some individuals might feel that rewards do not fairly match effort and performance. Despite
the negative side effects emphasized by Ordóñez et al. (2009), we follow Sholihin and Pike
(2013) in arguing that the PMEP considered by us both give employees some degree of voice,
in the sense that it is a rather participative way to set goals, and fulfills many of the six rules
put forward by Leventhal (1980). Therefore, we expect a positive effect of the presence of our
PMEP on employees' perception of procedural fairness.
There is an array of literature examining the link between procedural fairness and benefi-
cial employee behaviors (e.g. Korsgaard et al. (1995)), but most studies focus on the impact
of procedural fairness on employee behaviors like group commitment (e.g. Colquitt (2001))
and not effort per se. Exceptions specifically analyzing the impact of procedural fairness on
goal commitment as a concept related to effort are Wentzel (2002) and Sholihin et al. (2011).
Wentzel (2002) expects a positive relationship between procedural fairness and goal commit-
ment for two reasons: First, attaining the goal should be in the self-interest of the employee
in case procedures are fair (instrumental perspective) and second, compliance with the group
7For an overview, see Cropanzano et al. (2001).
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policy, in this case the goal, should affirm group membership (relational perspective). Both
Wentzel (2002) and Sholihin et al. (2011) find empirical support for this hypothesis. We
follow the authors and expect a positive impact of procedural fairness on effort, here proxied
by work engagement, and formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The direct effect of the presence of a PMEP on employee effort is medi-
ated by procedural fairness.
As compared to the literature on procedural fairness, studies that specifically examine
goal clarity are relatively scarce in the management accounting literature, although clarity
about the organization's goals is essential for performance management. Sholihin and Pike
(2013) e.g. state that the existence of prespecified goals is likely to provide clearer under-
standing (goal clarity) for organizational members and indicate how they will be evaluated
(p. 32). Further, they argue that goal specificity8 and clarity informs employees of their
responsibilities and performance targets and that the existence of specific goals will guide
employees in deciding where they should direct their attention and effort (p. 32). Since our
PMEP consists of the joint presence of an AI and a written TA, we argue that goals set via
this process are highly specific, inform employees about their responsibilities and performance
targets and should thus increase goal clarity. With respect to the goal clarity-performance
link, Anderson and Stritch (2015) expect that higher goal clarity leads to higher performance
by referring to classical goal setting theory (e.g. Dossett et al. (1979)) and indeed find a posi-
tive impact in a lab experiment. However, in some circumstances, goal clarity might actually
be detrimental to performance, as it might lead to tunnel vision (Seijts and Latham (2001);
Anderson and Stritch (2015)). Ordóñez et al. (2009) further argue that goals directed at goal
areas might crowd out effort directed at non-goal areas without leading to a greater overall
effort. We argue that engagement as our proxy for effort is rather general in the sense that
it does not differentiate between effort directed at goal and non-goal areas, such that we can
examine whether or not this is the case. We follow the bulk of the literature and expect both
a positive relationship between the presence of our PMEP and goal clarity and between goal
clarity and employee effort and formulate the following hypothesis:
8Note that Sholihin and Pike (2013), in line with Fang et al. (2005), define goal specificity as the extent
to which the goals are clearly defined by a supervisor. We therefore consider goal specificity as being an
antecedent to goal clarity.
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Hypothesis 4: The direct effect of the presence of a PMEP on employee effort is medi-
ated by goal clarity.
3 Data
In order to examine the nexus between the use of AIs, TAs, and work engagement, we use
a new, representative matched employer-employee data set covering German private sector
establishments with more than 50 employees, the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP) (for a de-
tailed description of the design of the data set and the sources of the applied constructs see
Kampkötter et al. (2016)).9 Surveyed establishments are randomly drawn from the IAB es-
tablishment panel, a representative annual survey of nearly 16,000 German establishments.
We can make use of the four waves 2012, 2014, 2016/17 and 2018/19 of the LPP linked
employer-employee data set. In detail, the employer survey covers between 769 and 1,219
establishments per wave. Establishment managers provide information on HRM practices
and other firm characteristics. From these establishments, a random sample of employees
working within the surveyed establishments (roughly between 6,500 and 7,500 individuals
per wave) are interviewed at home via telephone (CATI) or web interface (CAWI) about job
characteristics and perceptions, personal characteristics, attitudes towards their organization
and behavioral variables. This feature of the data enables us to examine the link between the
presence of AIs and TAs on the individual level and engagement, while simultaneously being
able to control for organizational characteristics on the level of the establishment. Further-
more, the longitudinal structure of the data allows us to employ panel data methods, which
enables us to move closer towards causality.
Our analysis is based on two items from the LPP employee survey. The item we use to
measure the presence of an AI asks the interviewee the following question: Did you have
an appraisal interview with your superior last year (e.g. on your professional growth or staff
assessment)? Please consider only appraisal interviews for which an appointment was made.
This question is then used as a filter question for the item measuring the incidence of a formal
TA, implying that, by construction, an employee can only be covered by a TA in case she is
also covered by an AI. It is important to stress the formal character of AIs, since respondents
should only consider meetings for which a formal appointment was made. The item measuring
9The data set is open to any researcher and is available via the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of
the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The DOI is:
10.5164/IAB.LPP1617.de.en.v1. For more details, see Haylock and Kampkötter (2019).
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the presence of a TA (in conjunction with an AI) is based on the following question: Did your
superior agree with you on the objectives fixed in writing during the appraisal interview?.
We use these two questions to construct two alternate specifications for our main explana-
tory variables of interest. We exploit this twofold strategy because we encounter a problem
common to fixed effects analyses, namely that we do not have enough within-variation to
separate the effect of the presence of the TA from the effect of the presence of the AI (Bender
et al. (2018)). This problem stems from the fact that an employee can only have a TA in case
she also has an AI. As a result, in a specification including both an AI and a TA dummy, the
TA dummy has to be interpreted as an interaction term. Therefore, the control group for the
TA variable are all individuals who report having an AI but no TA. In order to identify the
effect of TAs using individual fixed effects, we therefore need a sufficient number of employees
who report having an AI in both periods and either switch from having no TA to having one
or switch from having a TA to having none. However, most individuals either do not switch
at all within the four waves available to us, or they jointly switch in both the AI and the TA
variable. Therefore, we cannot disentangle the effect of the AI from the one of the TA in our
individual fixed effects specification in a meaningful way. For our first specification, we thus
construct a dummy variable taking the value one if an employee is covered by both an AI
and a TA, and zero otherwise. In case the dummy variable takes the value one, we define the
employee as being subject to a full PMEP. The coefficient of this variable can be interpreted
as the effect of the joint presence of AIs and TAs. Our second specification differentiates
between the presence of an AI and the presence of a TA by constructing two dummies: One
that takes the value one in case an employee is covered by an AI and zero otherwise and one
that takes the value one if an employee is covered by both an AI and a TA. Consequently, the
TA dummy measures the additional impact of the written TA in addition to the effect of the
AI.
As a proxy for individual effort, we apply the widely used, internationally validated nine-
item work engagement scale UWES-9 by Schaufeli and Bakker (2004). Respondents were
asked to indicate to which extent they agree with nine statements regarding their job such
as the following on a five point Likert scale: At my work, I feel bursting with energy.10 The
reported scores of every single item are then added up and divided by 9, such that the resulting
engagement score represents an equally weighted average with values between 1 and 5. We
further standardize this engagement score in order to make a quantitative interpretation in
standard deviations possible. Cronbach's Alpha of our engagement index is 0.915, suggesting
10A complete list of the items used can be found in the Appendix 6.1.
15
a high degree of internal consistency of this construct.
Our two potential mediators are conceptualized as follows. Goal clarity is based on two
items from the organizational climate questionnaire by Patterson et al. (2005). Specifically,
respondents are asked to state on a five point Likert scale to which extent they agree with the
following statements: The superiors clearly communicate requirements and objectives and
Everyone who works here is well aware of the long-term plans and direction of this company.
Again, the individual answers are added, the total score is divided by the number of items,
and the resulting index is standardized. Procedural fairness is operated by one item from the
justice scale by Kim and Leung (2007), which asks respondents to state on a five point Likert
scale to which extent they agree with the following statement: The rules and procedures to
make decisions are fair.. We again standardize this variable.
Furthermore, the data allows us to account for a rich set of control variables on the
establishment and individual level. Establishment-level controls comprise industry (5 cate-
gories), region (north, east, south, west), a set of dummies capturing ownership structure,
and a dummy capturing whether or not the establishment is independent. Individual-level
controls include sex (0/1), age (8 dummies), supervisory position (0/1), full-time position
(0/1), white-collar employee (0/1), monthly net income, type of employment contract (fixed
term/permanent), permanent relationship (0/1), highest level of school and occupational
or university education (7 dummies), household size, and survey method (CAWI/CATI).
Establishment-level controls include industry (5 dummies), regional area (4 dummies), and
establishment size (5 dummies). In all regressions, standard errors are clustered on the es-
tablishment level. Detailed descriptive statistics on our main dependent and independent
variables are displayed in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the Appendix.
In 2019, the latest year comprised in our data, the mean (unstandardized) engagement
index is 3.44, while the median is 3.56. Therefore, we observe a higher probability mass
at larger values of the engagement index, indicating that employees in our sample are, on
average, rather engaged. The distribution is also rather stable over time (mean values range
between 3.68 and 3.76 from 2012 to 2016). In total, our data comprises 16,506 employee-year
observations that are non-missing with respect to the AI variable. 8,622 (52.24 %) of these
employee-year observations reported having an AI. Out of these, 5,875 (68.14%) also reported
having a written TA.
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4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 The direct impact of a PMEP on employee effort
In order to investigate Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether there is a positive effect of the presence of
a full PMEP on employee effort, we use OLS regressions employing various fixed effects in
order to be able to make more causal statements. In addition, all of our specifications include
a rich set of covariates on the establishment and individual level, as can be seen in Table 1.
In column (1), we regress work engagement on PMEP by including all controls on the
establishment and individual level as well as establishment size and year fixed effects. The
positive PMEP coefficient is statistically and economically significant: the magnitude of the
coefficient implies that the engagement score of employees covered by a PMEP is, on average,
0.203 standard deviations higher compared to employees without a PMEP. Therefore, column
(1) provides first support to Hypothesis 1, indicating that target setting via a PMEP seems to
have a positive impact on employee effort. In column (2), we tackle the question whether the
impact of our PMEP on employee engagement is driven by the use of variable incentive pay
since achieving pre-negotiated targets might be tied to a variable pay component. Thus, it
might not be the PMEP per se that induces larger employee engagement, but rather the link
to variable pay. The simple correlation coefficient between the PMEP variable and the use of
variable compensation is 0.24, suggesting that employees who report having a PMEP also tend
to have a variable pay component. However, the size of this correlation is not large enough to
suggest that the two variables capture the same effect. Results in column (2) are consistent
with these descriptives: The coefficient of variable pay is positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that employees who have a variable pay component show, on average, a higher
work engagement. More important, the magnitude of the PMEP coefficient changes only
marginally, suggesting that the relationship between the PMEP and employee engagement is
not just driven by incentive pay.
In columns (3) and (4), we additionally include establishment and year fixed effects to
reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias and to take a further step towards causality.
In column (3), we separately include establishment and year fixed effects. Thereby, we are
able to account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity on the level of the establishment
while simultaneously controlling for general market trends through time fixed effects. Results
are robust as the coefficient of PMEP is positive and statistically significant. In fact, the
magnitude of the effect even increases from 0.193 to 0.245, suggesting that the effect gets
larger when taking the within-firm rather than the across-firm perspective (this difference is
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Table 1: Direct Effect of PMEP on Work Engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Engagement Index (std.)
PMEP 0.203*** 0.193*** 0.245*** 0.253*** 0.0783*** 0.0597**
(0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0285) (0.0239)
Variable Pay 0.0548*** 0.0706*** 0.0636*** -0.00861 -0.0133
(0.0196) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0305) (0.0254)
Establishment Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Employee Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Size FE yes yes yes
Establishment FE yes




Constant -0.324*** -0.346*** -0.418*** -0.466*** -0.187*** 0.223*
(0.0629) (0.0636) (0.118) (0.0433) (0.0552) (0.124)
Observations 16,506 16,498 16,498 16,026 4,296 16,498
Number of Employees 12,057
R-squared (within) 0.076 0.077 0.189 0.225 0.631 0.028
The dependent variable Engagement Index is an index containing the weighted average of nine items and
is standardized. All underlying items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (between 1 and 5). In all
columns, ordinary least squares regressions are applied. Employee controls comprise female (0/1), age (8
dummies), supervisory position (0/1), white-collar employee (0/1), full-time position (0/1), monthly net
income, type of employment contract (fixed term/permanent), permanent relationship (0/1), highest level
of training qualification (7 dummies), household size, and survey method (CAWI/CATI). Establishment-
level controls include industry (5 dummies), regional area (4 dummies), and establishment size (5 dum-
mies). Standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and ***
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
also statistically significant, p = 0.01). Here, we also account for unobserved establishment
level heterogeneity such as time-constant performance management or leadership culture.
In column (4), we include an interaction between establishment and year fixed effects. We
thereby allow unobserved, establishment-specific characteristics to vary over time. Results
remain virtually unchanged, both with respect to the magnitude and significance of the PMEP
coefficient.
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Columns (5) and (6) account for unobserved individual heterogeneity that both determines
an employee's engagement level and coverage by a PMEP. In column (5) we apply a lagged
dependent variable (LDV) model by including lagged individual engagement as an explanatory
variable. This specification accounts for the possibility that engagement is rather stable over
time and is not caused by the presence of a PMEP. Results indicate that this is partly the
case, as the size of the effect decreases from 0.259 to 0.0783 standard deviations. However,
even though the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced, it is still sizeable and statistically
significant, indicating that the presence of a PMEP does indeed have a positive impact on
employee engagement even if past engagement levels are controlled for. In column (6), we
finally conduct an individual fixed effects regression, now explicitly controlling for unobserved
individual-level heterogeneity. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, thus
confirming our previous results: a within-person change in PMEP leads to an increase in
employee engagement of around 0.06 standard deviations.11 To conclude, our results provide
support for Hypothesis 1, as we find a robust positive impact of the PMEP on individual work
engagement. On average, the positive effects of targets on employee effort as emphasized by
classical goal setting theory thus seem to outweigh potential negative side effects in our
representative sample.
4.2 Separating the impact of appraisal interviews and target agree-
ments on individual performance
In this section, we split the PMEP into its components. The aim is to analyze if the observed
positive effect of the PMEP on employee effort is driven by AIs alone or whether additional
formalization via written TAs in the performance management process provides additional
value.
In column (1) of Table 2, we check whether there is a positive relationship between the
presence of AIs and employee engagement. Results show a positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficient of 0.193 standard deviations.12 It is noteworthy that the coefficient in this
11In order to tackle issues related to selection bias and reverse causality, we estimate the IV method proposed
by Lewbel (2012) by using Stata's ivreg2h command developed by Baum and Schaffer (2012) as a robustness
check for our baseline specification in column (1). These issues might arise in case engaged individuals self-
select into having a PMEP or in case they are chosen for having a PMEP based on their previous level of
engagement. Our results remain qualitatively the same, such that the coefficient of PMEP is still positive
and statistically significant.
12Note that we directly control for variable pay in this specification. Results do not change when omitting
variable pay from the regression equation.
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Table 2: Direct Effects of AIs and TAs on Work Engagament
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Engagement Index (std.)
Appraisal Interview (AI) 0.193*** 0.124*** 0.144*** 0.150*** 0.114*** 0.0959***
(0.0193) (0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0272) (0.0358) (0.0301)
Target Agreement (TA) 0.111*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.0154 0.0104
(0.0238) (0.0265) (0.0267) (0.0335) (0.0268)
Variable Pay 0.0537*** 0.0483** 0.0675*** 0.0603*** -0.0107 -0.0152
(0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0220) (0.0227) (0.0305) (0.0253)
Establishment Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Employee Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Size FE yes yes yes
Establishment FE yes




Constant -0.391*** -0.359*** -0.443*** -0.505*** -0.221*** 0.205
(0.0658) (0.0636) (0.119) (0.0434) (0.0557) (0.124)
Observations 16,528 16,498 16,498 16,026 4,296 16,498
Number of Employees 12,057
R-squared (within) 0.077 0.078 0.190 0.227 0.632 0.030
The dependent variable Engagement Index contains the weighted average of nine items and is standardized.
All underlying items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (between 1 and 5). In all columns, ordinary least
squares regressions are applied. Employee controls comprise female (0/1), age (8 dummies), supervisory po-
sition (0/1), white-collar employee (0/1), full-time position (0/1), monthly net income, type of employment
contract (fixed term/permanent), permanent relationship (0/1), highest level of training qualification (7
dummies), household size, and survey method (CAWI/CATI). Establishment-level controls include industry
(5 dummies), regional area (4 dummies), and establishment size (5 dummies). Standard errors clustered on
the establishment level in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
specification is relatively similar to the coefficient of the PMEP variable in column (2) of
Table 1. Therefore, when not controlling for TAs, the AI variable seems to pick up the entire
effect of the presence of a PMEP. This can have two reasons: Either the effect of a PMEP on
work engagement is entirely driven by AIs such that formalization via written TAs does not
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increase engagement or there exists an omitted variable bias problem in column (1) of Table
2, such that part of the effect of AIs on engagement is actually due to the additional presence
of a written TA. We test this conjecture in column (2) by including the TA dummy. The
results show that the latter seems to be true. Both the AI and the TA variables show positive
and statistically significant coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficient of the AI variable is
reduced to 0.124, while the TA variable reports a coefficient of 0.111, indicating that approx-
imately half of the effect of AIs as reported in column (1) can actually be attributed to the
additional presence of a written TA.
Consistent with subsection 4.1, we also run two different specifications including establish-
ment fixed effects. In column (3), we include establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects
while we interact these two fixed effects in column (4). In analogy to Table 1, the results
remain qualitatively the same. Results up to this point thus provide support for hypotheses
2a and 2b. There seems to be both a positive impact of AIs on employee effort as proxied by
work engagement and an additional positive impact of formalization via a written TA.
In the last step, we again include lagged engagement in column (5) and individual fixed
effects in column (6). As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of AIs on work engagement is
still positive and statistically significant. However, the TA variable now turns statistically
insignificant. The same is true for the individual fixed effects regression in column (6). One
potential explanation refers to the joint presence of AIs and TAs in many firms, i.e. AIs
and TAs are often introduced jointly for employees. If this is true, estimating the isolated
effects of AIs and TAs in lagged dependent variable and fixed effects specifications is almost
impossible. The reasoning is the following: Fixed effects (and also lagged dependent variable
specifications) require a certain degree of variation within individuals, implying the need for
a sufficient amount of switchers. In order to identify a significant effect for our TA variable,
we would need a sufficient number of individuals who switch from having no TA in one period
to having one in the next period or vice versa. At this point it is crucial to remember that
by construction of the data set and also plausibly in firms, an individual can only have a TA
if she also has an AI. A switch from zero to one in the TA variable can thus capture two
different events: Either the employee obtains an AI and a TA jointly or the employee has
already had an AI in the previous period and in addition obtains a TA in the actual period.
In case AIs and TAs are introduced jointly, one cannot isolate the effects of an introduction
of AIs and TAs. The same reasoning applies in case the TA is abolished. Descriptive results
indeed suggest that a large fraction of individuals who switch from having no (an) AI to
having one (none) simultaneously switch from having no (a) TA to having one (none). Out
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of 503 (449) employees included in the individual fixed effects analysis who report switching
from zero to one (from one to zero) with respect to our AI variable, 221 (213) also report
switching from zero to one (one to zero) with respect to the TA variable. Therefore, the effect
of the TA variable can only be identified if the data contains enough individuals that report
having an AI in two consecutive periods and switch from having no TA to having one or vice
versa. Out of the 2,004 individuals who report having an AI in two consecutive periods, only
194 report switching from having no TA to having one, while 230 employees report switching
from having a TA to having none. Hence, it is highly likely that this lack of variation causes
our lagged dependent variable and fixed effects estimates for TAs to be insignificant. At least,
it nicely shows how challenging it can be to causally analyze isolated effects of simultaneously
applied performance management practices using firm data.
In sum, our analyses provide support for both hypotheses 2a and 2b. Results indicate
a positive impact of AIs on employee effort. This effect is robust across all specifications.
Results also provide evidence that formalization via written TAs further increases employee
effort, by showing a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all but the specifications
including lagged engagement and individual fixed effects. We are fairly certain that this is
due to a lack in within-variation. However, we acknowledge that our results with respect to
Hypothesis 2b are somewhat weaker as the ones regarding Hypothesis 2a.
4.3 Mediation analysis
In this section, we present our test of hypotheses 3 and 4, i.e. whether the direct effect of the
PMEP on employee effort is mediated by procedural fairness and goal clarity.13 To examine
these two potential channels, we follow the mediation analysis approach put forward by Baron
and Kenny (1986) and estimate three different equations. First, the potential mediator (goal
clarity, procedural fairness) is regressed on the independent variable, here PMEP. In a second
step, the dependent variable (engagement) is regressed on the potential mediator. In a third
step, the dependent variable is regressed on both the mediator and the independent variable.
Full mediation is achieved if the respective coefficients of interest are statistically significant in
the first two regressions and if a previously significant relationship between the independent
and the dependent variable in the first regression becomes insignificant when including the
mediator in the third regression. A variable partially mediates the relationship between an
13Note that in this analysis, we do not differentiate between AIs and TAs. However, looking at the two
performance management instruments separately, we find the same patterns as in the analysis presented
above.
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independent and a dependent variable if it significantly decreases the direct path between the
independent and the dependent variable rather than completely eliminating it. Very often
statistical relationships, such as the relationship between the presence of PMEP and employee
engagement have multiple causes, such that full mediation is rather unlikely.
Table 3 shows the results of our mediation analysis. As we consider column (6) of Table
1 to be our most reliable specification, we also use individual fixed effects for our mediation
analysis.14
Column (1) is equivalent to column (6) in Table 1 and again shows the positive effect of
the PMEP on employee engagement. Columns (2) and (3) depict the first step of the actual
mediation analysis, the regression of procedural fairness and goal clarity on the PMEP. As
can be seen from the coefficient of the PMEP variable in column (2), there seems to be
a significantly positive association between the presence of a PMEP and goal clarity. The
PMEP coefficient in column (3) also indicates a positive association with procedural fairness.
This coefficient is, however, only significant at the 10 percent level. Column (4) depicts
the second step of the mediation analysis, namely the regression of the dependent variable,
engagement index, on the potential mediators, goal clarity and procedural fairness.15 Both
the coefficients of the goal clarity index and the procedural fairness variable are positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that both goal clarity and procedural fairness are positively
associated with employee engagement. Column (5) depicts the third step, the regression of
the dependent variable, employee engagement, on both potential mediators, goal clarity and
procedural fairness, and the PMEP as our main independent variable. The results show that
all variables of interest report a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Furthermore,
the effect size and statistical significance of the PMEP variable decreases.
In sum, these results are consistent with partial mediation and we find evidence for hy-
potheses 3 and 4. The PMEP seems to increase employees' feeling of procedural fairness by
giving them some degree of voice. The increase in perceived procedural fairness then results
in a higher level of work engagement or effort, respectively. Furthermore, we find that the
PMEP increases goal clarity. This shows that performance management is a useful tool for
firms as it helps to make the organizational goals more visible to the workforce. Again, this
increase in goal clarity results in an increase in overall employee effort. However, results
indicate that procedural fairness and goal clarity do not fully, but only partially mediate the
14Note that the results are robust to and even more significant in all the other specifications applied above.
15In unreported further analyses, we also regress employee engagement on the two potential mediators
separately. Results are qualitatively robust, such that in both regressions, the coefficient of interest is positive
and statistically significant.
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Table 3: Mediation Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Engagement Goal Clarity Procedural Engagement Engagement
Index (std.) Index (std.) Fairness (std.) Index (std.) Index (std.)
PMEP 0.0597** 0.0834** 0.0657* 0.0461*
(0.0239) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0236)
Goal Clarity Index 0.0859*** 0.0846***
(0.0142) (0.0143)
Procedural Fairness 0.102*** 0.102***
(0.0123) (0.0123)
Variable Pay 0.0133 0.0553 0.0256 -0.0199 -0.0196
(0.0254) (0.0347) (0.0362) (0.0245) (0.0246)
Establishment Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Employee Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Size FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.223* 0.0389 -0.123 0.235* 0.233*
(0.124) (0.168) (0.173) (0.127) (0.121)
Number of Employees 12,057 12,251 12,188 11,992 11,974
Observations 16,498 16,839 16,740 16,395 16,351
R-squared (within) 0.028 0.019 0.011 0.069 0.070
The dependent variables are constructed as follows. Engagement Index contains the equally weighted average
of nine items. Procedural fairness contains one item. Goal Clarity Index contains the equally weighted average
of two items. All items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (between 1 and 5). The resulting variables
are standardized. In all columns, ordinary least squares regressions are used. Employee controls comprise
female (0/1), age (8 dummies), supervisory position (0/1), white-collar employee (0/1), full-time position
(0/1), monthly net income, type of employment contract (fixed term/permanent), permanent relationship
(0/1), highest level of training qualification (7 dummies), household size, and survey method (CAWI/CATI).
Establishment-level controls include industry (5 dummies), regional area (4 dummies), and establishment size
(5 dummies). Standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and ***
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
impact of the PMEP on work engagement, as the direct effect is still marginally significant.
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5 Discussion
Classical goal setting theory (e.g. Locke and Latham (1990, 2002, 2006)) has long emphasized
that there is a positive link between target setting mechanisms and employee effort. However,
recent contributions (Barsky (2008); Ordóñez et al. (2009); Liu and Zhang (2015); Eyring
and Narayanan (2018); Holzhacker et al. (2019)) provide evidence that the way goals are set
is important and that goal setting might also have negative side effects that can actually
outweigh its potential benefits. Most contributions in the management accounting literature
studying the impact of target setting on employee effort rely on experiments or cross-sectional
single firm case studies. Generalizable evidence about how targets influence effort on average
using large and representative data is missing. Indeed, Sholihin et al. (2011) call for such
evidence based on larger samples from various organizations determined randomly (p. 145).
We address this gap in the literature by investigating the impact of performance management,
focusing on appraisal interviews and written target agreements, on individual effort. We do so
by making use of four waves of the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), a large and representative
German linked employer-employee data set. As compared to prior studies, these data enable
us to both make more causal statements by employing various fixed effects and to test the
external validity using a representative data set.
Our results show a robust positive and statistically significant effect of the presence of a
performance management and evaluation process (PMEP) on employee effort. When dividing
the PMEP into its single components, we find a positive and statistically significant effect
of AIs on work engagement. Furthermore, our results show a positive additional impact
of TAs on work engagement. This effect is statistically significant in all but our lagged
dependent variable and individual fixed effects estimations. We explicitly discuss the challenge
of analyzing isolated effects of performance management practices using firm data, namely
the lag of within-variation: there are too few individuals in our data switching from having
no (a) TA to having one (none) without jointly making the same switch in the AI variable.
This makes it rather difficult to draw a causal statement about the additional effect of written
target agreements on individual effort. In a next step, we present the results of a mediation
analysis to learn more about the potential channels underlying our core results. We find that
the direct effect of PMEP on work engagement is partially mediated by procedural fairness
and goal clarity.
Of course, this study is not without weaknesses, the most important one being causality.
Even though we certainly move closer to causality than previous literature using firm data
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does, we cannot be sure whether the effects we find are really causal, as there is no random
assignment of employees into performance management practices. We try to take this possi-
bility into account by running further robustness checks, which confirm our baseline results.
As described above, the main advantage of our data is that, due to the large sample size,
the representativeness, and the panel structure of the data, we are able to make more causal
and generalizable statements. As a consequence, however, the disadvantage is that we do not
have information about the exact content of the AIs and the respective targets. In order to
get a more complete picture of the effects of performance management on employee effort,
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6 Appendix
6.1 Work Engagement - List of Items
Each of the following items should be answered on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (daily) to
5 (never):
1. At my work, I feel bursting with energy.
2. At my job, I feel strong and vigorous.
3. I am enthusiastic about my job.
4. My job inspires me.
5. When I get up in the morning, I feel like going to work.
6. I feel happy when I am working intensely.
7. I am proud of the work that I do.
8. I am immersed in my work.
9. I get carried away when I am working.
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Main Dependent and Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Appraisal Interview 16,506 0.522 0.500 0 1
Target Agreement/PMEP 16,506 0.356 0.479 0 1
Engagement Index 16,506 -0.00748 1.003 -3.206 1.588
(standardized)
Goal Clarity Index 16,469 -0.00475 1.003 -2.792 4.563
(standardized)
Procedural Fairness 16,392 -0.0142 1.011 -2.437 1.611
(standardized)
Engagement Index 16,506 3.669 0.837 1 5
(non-standardized)
Engagement - Energy 16,506 3.388 1.006 1 5
Engagement - Strong 16,506 4.019 0.859 1 5
Engagement - Enthusiastic 16,506 3.755 1.027 1 5
Engagement - Inspiring 16,506 3.369 1.262 1 5
Engagement - Feel Like Working 16,506 3.499 1.133 1 5
Engagement - Happy 16,506 3.819 1.083 1 5
Engagement - Proud 16,506 4.088 1.007 1 5
Engagement - Immersed 16,506 3.623 1.155 1 5
Engagement - Carried Away 16,506 3.460 1.164 1 5
Procedural Fairness 16,392 3.394 0.999 1 5
(non-standardized)
Goal Clarity - 16,469 3.653 0.955 1 8
(non-standardized)
Goal Clarity - 16,475 3.558 1.196 1 8
Long-Term Plans
Goal Clarity - 16,500 3.747 1.048 1 8
Requirements & Objectives
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics - Establishment-Level Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Establishment-Level Controls:
Establishment independent (0/1) 16,506 0.693 0.461 0 1
Industry - Manufacturing 16,506 0.299 0.458 0 1
Industry - Metal, Electronics, Automotive 16,506 0.402 0.490 0 1
Industry - Trade, Transportation, News 16,506 0.102 0.303 0 1
Industry - Business-Related Services 16,506 0.125 0.331 0 1
Industry - Information/Communication 16,506 0.0719 0.258 0 1
Region - North 16,506 0.192 0.394 0 1
Region - East 16,506 0.251 0.434 0 1
Region - South 16,506 0.276 0.447 0 1
Region - West 16,506 0.281 0.449 0 1
Size (Number of Employees) - Less Than 100 16,506 0.127 0.333 0 1
Size (Number Employees) - 100 to 249 16,506 0.231 0.422 0 1
Size (Number Employees) - 250 to 499 16,506 0.230 0.421 0 1
Size (Number Employees) - More Than 500 16,506 0.412 0.492 0 1
Principal Owner - Family/Founder 16,506 0.429 0.495 0 1
Principal Owner - Management 16,506 0.151 0.358 0 1
/Entrepreneurship
Principal Owner - Financial Investor 16,506 0.0931 0.291 0 1
Principal Owner - Widely Held 16,506 0.110 0.312 0 1
Stock Capital Market
Principal Owner - Government/ 16,506 0.0233 0.151 0 1
Public Sector
Principal Owner - Other 16,506 0.194 0.395 0 1
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Employee-Level Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age Category - under 25 (0/1) 16,506 0.0385 0.192 0 1
Age Category - 25 to 39 (0/1) 16,506 0.233 0.423 0 1
Age Category - 40 to 54 (0/1) 16,506 0.521 0.500 0 1
Age Category - over 55 (0/1) 16,506 0.207 0.405 0 1
Bonuses/Extra Payments (0/1) 16,498 0.594 0.491 0 1
Education - None (0/1) 16,506 0.00418 0.0645 0 1
Education - Lower Secondary School (0/1) 16,506 0.220 0.414 0 1
Education - Intermediate 16,506 0.424 0.494 0 1
Secondary School (0/1)
Education - University of Applied 16,506 0.110 0.313 0 1
Sciences Entrance Qualification (0/1)
Education - General Higher Education 16,506 0.235 0.424 0 1
Entrance Qualification (0/1)
Education - Other (0/1) 16,506 0.00685 0.0825 0 1
Female (0/1) 16,506 0.272 0.445 0 1
Fixed-Term Contract (0/1) 16,506 0.0451 0.208 0 1
Full Time/Part Time (0/1) 16,506 0.127 0.333 0 1
Net Income (in Euros) 16,506 2,418 1,842 1 74,221
Number Members Household 16,506 2.776 1.228 1 14
Serious Relationship (0/1) 16,506 0.841 0.366 0 1
Supervisor (0/1) 16,506 0.290 0.454 0 1
Training Qualification - None (0/1) 16,506 0.0210 0.143 0 1
Training Qualification - Apprenticeship (0/1) 16,506 0.462 0.499 0 1
Training Qualification - Vocational/ 16,506 0.0937 0.291 0 1
Business School (0/1)
Training Qualification - Master Craftsman/ 16,506 0.206 0.404 0 1
Technical College (0/1)
Training Qualification - University 16,506 0.0992 0.299 0 1
of Applied Sciences (0/1)
Training Qualification - University (0/1) 16,506 0.114 0.318 0 1
Training Qualification - Other (0/1) 16,506 0.00436 0.0659 0 1
White Collar (0/1) 16,506 0.625 0.484 0 1
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